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1 Introduction 
Robert Brandom’s follow-up to the monumental Making it Explicit1—in anticipation 
of which many have waited with baited breath—has finally appeared. Between Saying 
and Doing
2 is the text of his John Locke Lectures, delivered at the University of 
Oxford in 2006. Although Brandom is keen to insist that the two enterprises the books 
contain ‘are largely orthogonal’, many of the prominent themes in the most recent 
work will be familiar to readers of the earlier, including the connection between 
meaning and use, the expressive role of logic, the normative notions of commitment 
and entitlement, and the relation between the implicit and the explicit. Nonetheless, 
each is reframed here in the light of an ostensibly ‘new metatheoretic conceptual 
apparatus’ (p. 1), and it is the primary aim of the book to outline and demonstrate the 
utility of that apparatus, rather than argue for any specific thesis (although Brandom 
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does plenty of that along the way). In doing so, Brandom hopes to lay the foundations 
for what he calls an ‘analytic pragmatism’.  
 Brandom has certainly produced a fascinating, if dense and difficult, book, 
replete with interesting, controversial and interlocking ideas concerning intentionality, 
semantics, modality, normativity, logic and, most of all, their interrelations. 
Throughout, Brandom characteristically and illuminatingly seeks to locate these ideas 
within a philosophical tradition populated by such figures as Sellars, Wittgenstein, 
Kant and, increasingly, Hegel. As mentioned, the relevant issues are articulated and 
defended with the aid of what are presented as novel analytical tools. However, while 
the apparatus certainly has an unfamiliar appearance, and while I do not profess to 
have fully mastered it, it is not at all clear to me that the method underlying the 
machinery is really so new, or that the results of employing it are not results that 
could be otherwise achieved or expressed. 
 
2 Meaning-use relations 
So as to engage critically with Brandom’s proposal, I shall outline the basic 
components of the complex apparatus he introduces, which are first introduced 
against the background of what Brandom describes as the ‘epic confrontation of 
analytic philosophy and pragmatism, especially Wittgensteinian’. According to 
Brandom, analytic philosophy is best understood as having ‘at its center a concern 
with semantic relations between […] “vocabularies”’ (p. 1). While they might 
characterise it differently (for example, in terms of supervenience, truth-making, 
definition, translation, or reduction), analytic philosophers seek to specify what 
relation holds (if any) between, say, descriptive and normative statements, or physical 
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and intentional statements, and typically do so with the aid of logical vocabulary. No 
doubt many would reject this generalisation, but for present purposes I shall grant it. 
According to Brandom, pragmatism challenges the analytic project by 
privileging pragmatics (broadly construed) over semantics, by ‘displacing the notion 
of meaning in favour of that of use’ (p. 3).3 Starting out from the putative insight that 
vocabularies mean what they do in virtue of the use to which they are put, the 
pragmatist denies that ‘linguistic practices and the vocabularies caught up in them […] 
typically admit of specification in terms of underlying principles specifiable in other 
vocabularies’. The principal reason for this is the allegedly ‘essentially dynamic 
character of linguistic practice’. No principle for the use of an expression could be 
informatively or finitely articulated, since ‘what practical extensions of a given 
practice are possible for the practitioners can turn on features of their embodiment, 
lives, environment, and history that are contingent and wholly particular to them’ (pp. 
5-6). 
 It is Brandom’s grand ambition to reconcile analytic philosophy and 
pragmatism. Specifically, in addition to considering semantic relations between 
vocabularies, with analytic philosophy, Brandom invites us to consider, with 
pragmatism, relations between vocabularies and practices-or-abilities, as well as 
between practices-or-abilities themselves.4 
 Brandom proceeds to introduce a number of such ‘meaning-use relations’ 
(MURs), which he represents diagrammatically. PV-sufficiency ‘obtains when 
engaging in a specified set of practices […] is sufficient for someone to count as 
deploying a specific vocabulary’. VP-sufficiency obtains when a ‘vocabulary is 
sufficient to specify’ a practice. Where a vocabulary, V1, is VP-sufficient for 
characterising a practice PV-sufficient for deploying another, V2, a further 
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‘pragmatically mediated’ relation between the vocabularies results, namely that V1 is 
a pragmatic metavocabulary for V2. An especially interesting case is when V1, the 
pragmatic metavocabulary, is ‘weaker in expressive power’ than V2, i.e. when there 
are things one can say using V2 that one cannot say using V1 (pp. 9-11). Brandom 
calls this pragmatic expressive bootstrapping. 
 Brandom adds to this basic set of MURs. PV-necessity ‘obtains when one 
cannot deploy a certain vocabulary without engaging in the specified practice’ (p. 28). 
PP-necessity obtains when being able to participate in a practice, P1, is necessary for 
being able to participate in another, P2. This in turn ‘induces a resultant pragmatically 
mediated semantic relation between vocabularies’, namely VV-necessity (pp. 12-13). 
V1 is VV-necessary for V2, if P1 is PV-sufficient for deploying V1 and PP-necessary 
for P2, which is PV-sufficient for deploying V2. 
 A further relation—put to a lot of use—is PP-sufficiency, which ‘holds when 
having acquired one set of abilities means one can already do everything one needs to 
do, in principle, to be able to do something else’ (p. 26). There are at least two ways 
in which PP-sufficiency might obtain. First, P1 might be ‘algorithmically elaborated’ 
into P2, in the sense that exercising the abilities required for P2 just is exercising the 
abilities involved in P1 in a certain fashion. Corresponding to this is VV-sufficiency, 
which obtains between V1 and V2 when the practice PV-sufficient for deploying V1 
is algorithmically PP-sufficient for the practice PV-sufficient for deploying V2. In 
such a case, V1 may be described as a semantic metavocabulary sufficient to 
‘characterise’ V2 (p. 39). A second way in which P1 might be PP-sufficient for P2 is 
when ‘as a matter of contingent empirical fact […] anyone who has the one set of 
capacities can be brought to have the other as well’ by ‘learning or training’ (pp. 83-
84).  
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 These MURs can be further combined into still more complex relations. The 
most important, for Brandom, is LX, which obtains between V1 and V2 when, first, 
P1 is PV-necessary for deploying V1 and (algorithmically) PP-sufficient for P2, 
second, P2 is PV-sufficient for deploying V2, and finally, V2 is VP-sufficient for 
specifying P1. When this obtains, V2 is elaborated from and explicative of V1. What 
one says in employing V2 is implicit in the deployment of V1. 
 
3 The apparatus in action 
In the abstract, this bewildering array of relations can be hard to keep a handle on. 
Accordingly, Brandom hopes to demonstrate the power of his apparatus through 
applying it to a number of philosophically significant cases, specifically the relations 
among logical, intentional, semantic, modal and normative vocabularies and the 
practices of employing them. In this section, I shall briefly outline some of Brandom’s 
analyses. 
Brandom aims to show that logical vocabulary stands in the LX relation to any 
vocabulary whatsoever. The argument is, very roughly, as follows. Asserting and 
inferring are PP-necessary for one another, and both are PV-necessary for deploying 
any vocabulary (form an essential part of any ‘discursive practice’). One is not a 
language-user unless one can make claims and use them to draw inferences. Moreover, 
‘the abilities to make assertions and sort inferences into those that are and those that 
are not materially good ones’ can be algorithmically elaborated into (are PP-sufficient 
for) an ability ‘PV-sufficient to deploy a further vocabulary, namely conditional 
locutions’ (p. 44). A language-user’s existing abilities to respond practically to an 
inference by treating it as good and to respond to a stimuli by making an assertion 
using non-logical vocabulary can be reconfigured into an ability to respond to what 
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she takes to be a materially good inference by making an assertion using the 
conditional and to respond to such assertions by treating an inference as good.  
In Brandom’s view, deploying the conditional—saying, for example, ‘If the 
ball is red, then it is coloured’—allows one to specify (is VP-sufficient to describe) 
what one is doing when one treats an inference as materially good. And since 
deploying the conditional allows one to say that one claim follows from another when 
this cannot be said in the vocabulary whose use the ability of employing conditionals 
is elaborated from, we have a case of expressive pragmatic bootstrapping. 
 Suggestively, Brandom adds that this conclusion, if true, vindicates the 
analytic philosopher’s traditional appeal to logical vocabulary in analysing semantic 
relations. Since the logical vocabulary is an elaboration, in Brandom’s sense, of the 
non-logical vocabulary to be analysed, logical vocabulary adds nothing that is not 
already present (it is ‘semantically transparent’). In addition, since logical vocabulary 
allow one to say things about the analysed vocabulary that could not otherwise be 
expressed, its use can be genuinely instructive (it is ‘analytically efficacious’) (pp. 52-
53). 
 Brandom proceeds to argue that normative and modal vocabulary likewise 
stand in LX relations to descriptive vocabularies in general. Even more roughly, the 
respective arguments run as follows. First, the ability to infer—to tell in practice what 
a claim commits one to and when one is entitled to those commitments—is PV-
necessary for deploying any vocabulary. Hence, ‘discursive practitioners must be able 
in practice to take or treat each other and themselves as exhibiting normative statuses’ 
(p. 114). This ability is algorithmically PP-sufficient for an ability PV-sufficient for 
normative vocabulary, an ability to respond to a normative status by explicitly saying, 
for example, ‘S is committed to p’. This normative vocabulary in turn stands in the 
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VP-sufficiency relation to discursive practice, since it allows subjects to codify 
aspects of that practice. 
 Second, the ability to infer is PV-necessary for deploying any vocabulary. 
Hence, to be able to infer one must be able to distinguish, for each commitment, the 
range of further commitments that would, and would not, ‘infirm or defeat it’ (p. 79). 
This ability is algorithmically PP-sufficient for an ability PV-sufficient for modal 
vocabulary, an ability to explicitly say, for example, ‘It is not possible that p and not-
q’. This modal vocabulary in turn stands in the VP-sufficiency relation to discursive 
practice, since it allows subjects to codify aspects of that practice. 
 Interestingly, and controversially, Brandom argues that normative vocabulary 
occupies a privileged position, insofar as it can serve ‘as a pragmatic metavocabulary 
for logical vocabulary, including modal vocabulary’ (p. 119). In short, Brandom 
explains the implicitly modal notion of incompatibility in terms of the normative 
notions of commitment and entitlement—p and q are incompatible if commitment to p 
precludes entitlement to q. In turn, Brandom employs this notion of incompatibility in 
a modal formal semantics—one which makes no direct use of the notion of truth—
with which he defines various other logical notions, including negation and entailment, 
and modal notions, including necessity and possibility. In a final and intriguing 
chapter, whose dark details I cannot adequately enter into here, Brandom argues that 
normative and modal vocabularies—the abilities to use which can be algorithmically 
elaborated from the ability to use any vocabulary whatsoever—can together be used 
to specify (are VP-sufficient for) discursive practices in general; specifically, they 
make explicit the intentionality of language-use.  
 
4 New for old 
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Having introduced Brandom’s ‘meaning-use analytic’ apparatus and considered, if 
cursorily, its application, it is time critically to examine Brandom’s latest enterprise. 
No doubt, one might be tempted to challenge certain of Brandom’s specific theses or 
the arguments he offers in their support. But, in line with the aims of his book, I shall 
focus on the more general, metatheoretical issue of how new Brandom’s approach 
really is.5 That is, I shall examine whether Brandom succeeds in his ambition of 
‘ushering in a new phrase of the analytic project’ (p. 32) through introducing 
‘distinctive’ pragmatically mediated analytic relations ‘quite different from, for 
instance, definability, translatability, reducibility, and supervenience’ (p. 11). While 
the new-fangled system of MURs certainly has an alien appearance, as do the theses 
advanced with its help, underneath it all there seems to be lurking a rather traditional 
philosophy.  
Consider, for example, Brandom’s characterisation of one aspect of Sellars’ 
critique of phenomenalism (p. 12). Reformulating the argument in terms of MURs, 
Sellars claims, says Brandom, that practices PV-sufficient for ‘is’-Φ talk are PP-
necessary for the practices PV-sufficient for ‘looks’-Φ talk. But, one might ask, what 
does this amount to? As Brandom acknowledges, it amounts to saying—in the terms 
of analytic philosophy—that ‘looks’-Φ talk semantically presupposes ‘is’-Φ talk. In 
that case, it would seem that the upshot of Sellars’ analysis, as Brandom presents it, is 
a rather traditional claim.  
Moreover, the claim of VV-necessity (or semantic presupposition) is surely 
not one that could only be arrived at through the use of Brandom’s apparatus. 
Consider, in this regard, Daniel Bonevac’s comments: 
Sellars argues at some length that being Φ is logically prior to looking Φ. But that 
conclusion requires no sophisticated argument. ‘Looks red’, for example, is not an 
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idiom; its meaning is a function of the meanings of ‘looks’ and ‘red’. All one needs to 
establish that being Φ is logically prior to looking Φ is an appeal to compositionality.6 
One can certainly appreciate this point so formulated—and Bonevac has no trouble in 
so formulating it—without having to view the semantic relation as ‘mediated’ by a 
pragmatic one (although it might well be so mediated).  
So far, I have suggested that one of the claims that Brandom’s meaning-use 
analysis delivers is in fact recognisably traditional and (so) a claim that could be, and 
indeed has been, arrived at in a more orthodox fashion. This in turn strongly indicates 
that Brandom’s ‘addition’ of a mediating layer of practices does not add anything 
bearing argumentative clout to the version offered in purely of semantic terms.  
Note also that the ‘additional’ pragmatic story is actually part and parcel of the 
original argument. Indeed, Sellars himself happily switches interchangeably between 
the semantic and pragmatic levels: 
the concept of looking green, the ability to recognize that something looks green, 
presupposes the concept of being green, and […] the latter concept involves the 
ability to tell what colour objects have by looking at them.7 
Sellars apparently treats the semantic and pragmatic stories as two sides of the same 
coin, rather than viewing the latter in this instance as a deepening of or addition to the 
former.  
Of course, Brandom might reply that Sellars is ready to proceed in this way, 
since he is himself a pragmatist, whose methodological approach Brandom is 
developing. Consider instead, then, Brandom’s example of indexical vocabulary. 
Since our interest is in the general framework, I shall not enter into the details of 
Brandom’s arguments. His guiding idea is that ‘in spite of the semantic irreducibility 
of indexical to non-indexical vocabulary, it is possible to say, in entirely non-
indexical terms, what one must do in order to be deploying indexical vocabulary 
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correctly’ (p. 25). According to Brandom, non-indexical vocabulary is VP-sufficient 
to describe the ability PV-sufficient for indexical vocabulary. Moreover, that ability 
can be algorithmically elaborated from the ability PV-sufficient for non-indexical 
vocabulary.  In turn, indexical vocabulary is VP-sufficient to specify features of the 
ability PV-sufficient for non-indexical vocabulary, which is to say that the 
vocabularies stand in the LX relation. Finally, since the ability to deploy non-
indexical vocabulary is algorithmically PP-sufficient to deploy indexical vocabularies, 
the former vocabulary is VV-sufficient for the latter. 
This last point, which Brandom does not explicitly make, amounts to the claim 
that indexical vocabulary is a semantic metavocabulary for non-indexical vocabulary. 
In that case, however, the relation of VV-sufficiency looks suspiciously like or 
approximates closely to what analytic philosophers traditionally call supervenience or 
truth-making. If the VV-sufficiency relation holds, facts that one might state using 
indexical vocabulary supervene upon or are made true by facts one might state using 
non-indexical vocabulary; the latter are sufficient for the truth of the former. As the 
LX relation running between the vocabularies in the converse direction shows, what is 
expressed using indexical terms is implicit in what is expressed using non-indexical 
terms.  
It seems, once again, that Brandom’s meaning-use analysis results in a 
remarkably familiar philosophical claim, albeit one dressed in unfamiliar clothes. To 
appreciate this, compare Brandom’s approach to one found in another set of John 
Locke Lectures, namely Frank Jackson’s From Metaphysics to Ethics.8 This provides 
an especially interesting comparison for a number of reasons. First, Jackson’s work—
which aims to identify ‘when matters described in one vocabulary are made true by 
matters described in another’9 —falls squarely within the analytic tradition as 
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Brandom characterises it. Second, Jackson is as explicit and clear as Brandom 
concerning the metatheoretical apparatus with which he operates. Third, Jackson too 
examines the relation between facts stated with indexical vocabulary and those stated 
with non-indexical vocabulary.  
Like Brandom, Jackson claims that ‘egocentric or de se content is irreducibly 
so’.10 Nonetheless, and effectively like Brandom, he argues that ‘the truth-value of 
each and every token with egocentric content supervenes on the full de dicto story 
about the world’ (pp. 19-21). Though they present their views in very different ways, 
both Brandom and Jackson agree that the story told in non-indexical terms is 
sufficient for the story told in indexical terms. It is unclear, then, how Brandom’s 
approach differs in substance, if not style, from that of a traditional analytic 
philosopher like Jackson. Indeed, in strikingly Brandomian terms, Jackson claims to 
be ‘distinguishing what appears explicitly in an account from what appears implicitly 
in it’.11 
Brandom might point to the relation of PP-sufficiency underlying VV-
sufficiency, about which Jackson is silent, to highlight what distinguishes the 
approach of the analytic pragmatist:  
What does this meaning-use analysis tell us? It shows us that, and how, anyone who 
knows how to use non-indexical vocabulary already knows how to do everything she 
needs to, in principle (a qualification we can cash out precisely, in terms of 
algorithmic elaborative abilities), to deploy indexical vocabulary. So one could never 
be in the position of understanding non-indexical vocabulary but being mystified by 
indexical vocabulary (p. 67). 
While it is true that Jackson is principally concerned with how vocabularies are 
‘interconnected’12, i.e. with semantic relations, he also allows that there are abilities 
(in Brandom’s broad sense) PV-sufficient for vocabularies. Jackson, like Brandom, is 
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a functionalist (again, in a broad sense), accepting that ‘it is the functional role of a 
belief that determines its content’.13 Moreover, Jackson could readily allow the ability 
PV-sufficient for non-indexical vocabulary could be algorithmically elaborated into 
the ability PV-sufficient for indexical vocabulary (that a PP-relation corresponds to 
the VV-relation on which he focuses). The important issue is whether this adds 
anything to the story at the semantic level, especially as one can arrive at and 
formulate the VV-sufficiency point without going via the observation about PP-
sufficiency. That the facts characterised in indexical terms supervene upon those 
characterised in non-indexical terms might be sufficient to demystify the former (on 
the assumption that they are mystifying in the first place); it is far from self-evident 
that reformulating this point in terms of the abilities to deploy the relevant terms is 
more efficacious in addressing our philosophical concerns. Suppose, with Jackson, 
that non-indexical statements entail indexical statements. Do we learn anything more 
of relevance about this semantic relation by being told that the ability to state the 
latter is a derived from the ability to state the former? It is not clear that we do. As 
above, one might view the semantic and pragmatic stories as two sides of the same 
coin, rather than providing a superficial explanation and an underlying one 
respectively. 
Needless to say, I cannot decisively settle here whether or not the 
pragmatically augmented version of the analysis is more effective than the merely 
semantic; the present point is only that it is not obvious that it is or that it contains 
anything not already found (albeit not in so many words) in traditional analytic 
philosophy.  
 Brandom might urge that what is distinctive about the meaning-use analysis is 
not that it reveals that non-indexical vocabulary provides a semantic metavocabulary 
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for indexical vocabulary, but rather that it demonstrates that indexical vocabulary, like 
logical vocabulary, is a pragmatic metavocabulary for non-indexical vocabulary, i.e. 
VP-sufficient for specifying the practice of using it (specifically, in Brandom’s view, 
as involving the immediate acknowledgement of practical commitments). However, 
to make a more substantive critical point, this claim is misleading. Originally, VP-
sufficiency was introduced as obtaining when a vocabulary is sufficient to ‘specify’ a 
practice, to ‘say’ what its practitioners are doing (p. 10). But in this sense indexical 
vocabulary is not VP-sufficient for the use of non-indexical vocabulary.14 In saying, ‘I 
am jogging now’, I am not saying anything about linguistic practices, but instead 
about what I am doing, namely that I am jogging now. So, I am not making explicit 
features of what a subject does when she uses non-indexical vocabulary. It would be 
more felicitous to say that, on Brandom’s analysis, when using indexical vocabulary, 
one is explicitly doing something with certain words that one could otherwise only do 
implicitly.  
 Now that might be both true and interesting (I suspect it is). But it is not 
properly-speaking VP-sufficiency (as Brandom defines it). What Brandom is actually 
offering is an account of the functional role (pragmatics) of sentences involving 
indexical vocabulary, that is, a PV-sufficiency claim about what use a certain sort of 
expression must possess in order to bear the distinctive kind of meaning that it does 
(specifically, for Brandom, it must function as the immediate acknowledgement of a 
practical commitment). We have already seen, however, that PV-sufficiency claims of 
this sort are advanced by traditional analytic philosophers and, furthermore, do not 
obviously contribute anything additional to the analytic story told merely at the 
semantic level (about the relation between matters described in indexical vocabulary 
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and those described in non-indexical vocabulary). This excursus, then, has done 
nothing more to show that Brandom’s apparatus makes a distinctive contribution. 
 It seems, therefore, that Brandom’s ‘new synthesis of pragmatic and analytic 
philosophy’ (p. 30) might not be so new. A further respect in which Brandom’s 
project is more similar to traditional analytic philosophy than he suggests is in his 
response to ‘the weightiest, deepest, and most important sort of objection to the 
classical project of philosophical analysis’ (p. 203). Brandom claims that one respect 
in which his analytical approach qualifies as pragmatist, and so novel, is in 
incorporating ‘the insights of the later Wittgenstein’ (p. xii). However, without 
needing to take a stand on Wittgenstein exegesis,15 Brandom’s enterprise is not 
‘pragmatist’ in a Wittgensteinian sense according to his own interpretation of the later 
work. 
 Recall that, according to Brandom, Wittgenstein insists that the ‘dynamic’ 
character of language use cannot, in general, be captured by finite, articulable 
principles expressed in independent terms. Brandom, however, aims to show that the 
use of various vocabularies, including logical, can be algorithmically decomposed 
into more basic uses of other vocabularies, which uses can be specified in independent 
terms, and that certain vocabularies can be deployed informatively to characterise 
others. These endeavours seem premised on the idea or designed to show that 
Wittgenstein is wrong, at least for certain tracts of language. It is unclear, then, to 
what extent Brandom genuinely ‘incorporates’, rather than simply rejects, 
Wittgensteinian pragmatism. (This is not to say that there are not other pragmatist 




I have expressed doubts about the novelty of the approach Brandom advances. Both 
its proximity to pragmatism and, especially, its distance from traditional analytic 
philosophy (as he characterises both) seem overstated. VV-sufficiency and -necessity 
claims are the traditional fodder of analytic philosophy (as Brandom describes it) and 
can be arrived at without the apparatus of MURs. That underlying them are pragmatic 
relations might not be urgent news. 
 The focus has primarily been on Brandom’s metatheoretic apparatus. I have 
said little about the specific ideas Brandom advances in the course of developing that 
apparatus, many of which seem to me interesting, often plausible and well-supported, 
and certainly worth attending to. They deserve and will no doubt receive considerable 
critical scrutiny. The reservations concern only whether Brandom’s machinery of 
MURs is required in order to formulate, appreciate or debate those ideas. Similarly, I 
have not challenged the guiding thought that what an expression means is related to 
its use; on the contrary, it seems entirely right to view investigations of meaning and 
of a certain sort of use as two sides of the same coin. 
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